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Pegging in a coordinated way to a regional basket currency is considered by many as 
optimal for east-Asian countries. By contrast, according to existing empirical studies, these 
countries have most often relied on noncooperative United States dollar or G3 pegs. We 
show for the first time that by the late 1990s, with some reversals, a majority of east-Asian 
countries had already moved, de facto, away from the dollar peg and started targeting a 
basket, including east-Asian currencies (an “Asian Currency Unit”). Common-shock or 
market-based interpretations of such moves are ruled out since we document that, with few 
exceptions, countries in the region have in reality stuck to fixed exchange rates. We obtain 
such results using a Markov-switching estimation benchmarked against Bai-Perron structural 
break tests for the synthesis model of Frankel and Wei (2007), which augments the 
inference about currency weights in a basket with the weight on exchange-market pressure. 
In order to measure the latter, the forward positions of central banks in the foreign exchange 
market are taken into account. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The exchange rate regime and basket composition of east-Asian currencies has been an 
area of lively debate. A widely-held hypothesis is that a noncooperative United States (US) 
dollar or G3 (Europe, Japan and the US) currency peg has been the dominant feature for a 
large number of them. In the view of many observers, a cooperative peg to a regional 
monetary unit would be far superior. We propose to reconcile these two apparently 
conflicting propositions by examining to what extent east-Asian countries have started to peg 
by stealth to a basket including a regional monetary unit. In order to address this question, 
this paper uses regime-switching approaches to dating modifications in exchange rate 
regimes of east-Asian countries and tracking movements in the composition of their basket 
pegs.  
Recent events have motivated such an inquiry. In the face of the global financial crisis, it is 
expected that east-Asian countries would (jointly) allow more exchange-rate flexibility in 
order to cushion the impact of such an exceptionally large (common) shock on their 
economies. Further, if one country in the region changes its exchange-rate regime—such as 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) did in the summer of 2005, and Japan did in January 
2003—will other countries in the region emulate them? The PRC’s return of the yuan to a 
managed float in June 2010 makes such an inquiry all the more important. 
The de facto peg to the dollar of most east-Asian currencies before the 1997–1998 crisis, as 
well as the alleged return to such a peg in the aftermath of the crisis, have been lamented as 
a coordination failure (Ogawa and Ito 2002; Ohno 1999). Given the rapid rise of intra-
regional trade integration among these economies, and on the basis of models of optimal 
basket pegs (Benassy-Quéré 1999), many observers favor east-Asian countries pegging 
their currencies to a basket where regional currencies are included (Kawai and Takagi 2000; 
Kawai 2007; Ogawa and Shimizu 2005; Williamson 2005). However, it may not be optimal to 
include only one regional currency in the basket (i.e., the Japanese yen) on top of the dollar 
and the European Union euro, thus making it a basket of G3 currencies (Mundell 2003), 
particularly in view of the growing role of the PRC as a hub of regional trade. Indeed, it has 
been recently shown via simulations in a game-theoretical setting that the welfare of east-
Asian economies would be enhanced by moving from a dollar peg to a basket including a 
regional currency unit (Sheng, Kwek, and Cho 2009). 
On the empirical side, the workhorse for measuring de facto currency (basket) pegs, as 
suggested by Frankel and Wei (1992), is a regression of special-drawing-right (SDR) 
exchange rate returns of a domestic currency on the returns of the dollar, yen, and euro vis-
a-vis the SDR. Such work shows the resilience of the dollar peg in east-Asian countries up to 
the mid-2000s (Ogawa and Shimitzu 2005; Kawai 2007). An alternative approach, using the 
relative volatilities of exchange-market-pressure indices, and combining changes in 
exchange rates and foreign currency reserves, reaches a similar conclusion (Henandez and 
Montiel 2003). A synthesis of the two approaches, suggested by Frankel and Wei (2008), 
would augment the inference about currency weights in a G3 basket with the weight on 
exchange-market pressure, enabling us to gauge the degree of exchange rate flexibility.  
There is thus consensus about the significant gap between theory and practice: in theory a 
regional-currency-unit basket is preferable to a G3 basket, but east-Asian governments 
would be unable to get together and coordinate action for implementation of this preferred 
option, and would simply fall back on a noncooperative, or Nash, equilibrium where they peg 
to the dollar. This consensus is so strong that it has constrained all work on employing the 
type of test advocated by Frankel and Wei (1992), resulting in a focus on G3 currencies 
exclusively. However, suppose that east-Asian governments were as smart as game 
theorists (or were listening to their advice) and had in fact already started some time ago to 
target a basket that included a regional currency unit instead of the yen. This hypothesis 
could be tested by estimating the synthesis model modified to allow for exchange-regime ADBI Working Paper 262    Girardin 
 
2 
changes (and possible reversals) away from the much-documented dollar peg to a basket 
that included a regional monetary unit. 
The construction of an Asian currency or monetary unit is a controversial step in this 
endeavor. Indeed, ongoing debate has those who champion basing weights for a regional 
currency unit on nominal gross domestic product (GDP) (Kawai and Takagi 2009; Girardin 
and Steinherr 2008) opposite those who would base such weights on GDP adjusted by 
purchasing power parity (PPP) (Ogawa and Shimizu 2005)—on top of trade and financial 
weights which are less controversial. While PPP-adjusted GDP weights have a forward-
looking nature, they are rather arbitrary. Nominal GDP-based weights are arguably easier to 
assess and—partly due to this reason—were used by European countries for the European 
Currency Unit. In order to enlarge the set of possible anchor-baskets as well as to allow for 
the fact that not all east-Asian countries may have targeted the same unit, our analysis uses 
principal components of regional exchange rate returns on broad and narrow sets of 
currencies. First, our analysis in this paper uses a regime-switching framework to detect 
changes in the exchange-rate regimes of the 13 Association of Southeast-Asian Nations+3 
(ASEAN+3) countries.
1
We first show that, far from implying a switch to more exchange-rate flexibility, the end of the 
east-Asian crisis saw most countries in the region sticking to fixed exchange rates. The rare 
exceptions were Japan and the Republic of Korea, where flexibility was a frequently 
dominant feature. We then document that, contrary to a widely-held belief, the east-Asian 
crisis did not lead to a general retreat to the status quo ante of a noncooperative dollar peg. 
Instead, it marked the beginning of a new era in which a core group of south-east-Asian 
countries started including a combination of regional currencies in their baskets. This group 
was later joined temporarily or permanently by other countries, as well as by northeast Asian 
countries. Given our first finding on the dominance of fixed exchange rates, such a basket 
cannot be the by-product of common shocks to countries in the region, or of market forces. 
Such deliberate moves certainly reflected appreciation of increasing regional 
interdependence. It also must have contributed to preserving stability in the region during the 
global financial crisis, and to forestalling beggar-thy-neighbor policies.  
  We propose to use a Markov-switching (Hamilton 1989; 1994) 
estimation of the synthesis model of Frankel and Wei (2007) in order to gauge the timing, 
possibility, and extent of a switch to a regional-currency-unit basket peg. Monthly data from 
January 1999 through May 2009 are used. This estimation is shown to be dominant for a 
larger number of countries than the Bai and Perron (2003) multiple structural break model 
[applied to the synthesis model by Fankel and Xie (2010)]. Second, forward positions—held 
by a number of east-Asian central banks in the foreign exchange market—are taken into 
account in order to better assess changes in the degree of exchange rate flexibility, through 
the exchange-market-pressure term. Finally, the composition of the basket is assessed 
using statistical measures, based on Principal-Component Analysis (PCA), to assign weights 
to the different currencies in the asian currency unit (ACU). 
Section 2 of this paper reviews the literature on basket pegging in east Asia. In section 3, the 
econometric methodology and data are introduced, and construction of alternative ACUs is 
explained. Section 4 presents the results of the alternative regime-switching estimations of 
the “synthesis model.” Section 5 interprets the results and examines their implications for 
regional cooperation. Conclusions are presented in section 6. 
 
                                                 
1  Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, the PRC, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam. ADBI Working Paper 262    Girardin 
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2.  PEGGING TO A BASKET AND HOW TO FIND IT 
2.1  Optimality of a Peg to a Regional Basket 
The set for the choice of exchange rate regimes for east-Asian countries excludes corner 
solutions—such as currency boards or free floats—and comprises three options: (i) a 
unilateral (often implicit) dollar or basket peg, (ii) some form of multilateral regional exchange 
rate arrangement on the way to monetary union, and (iii) flexible (often managed) exchange 
rates. The east-Asian financial crisis led observers to question the heavy reliance of 
emerging east-Asian countries on a dollar or basket peg, since implicit exchange rate 
targeting was often combined with an implicit government bail-out guarantee for domestic 
banks. The 1997–1998 crisis showed, often painfully, that such a combination created a 
moral hazard through a new impossible trinity, involving exchange-rate targeting, free capital 
flows, and a bail-out guarantee (Dooley 2000). In the aftermath of the crisis, global financial 
institutions—particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—commonly recommended 
that such countries rely on flexible exchange-rates with inflation targeting. While a number of 
emerging east-Asian countries indeed complied officially with such recommendations, it is 
now common knowledge that many of them de facto continued, to varying degrees, to target 
their exchange rate with the US dollar [see the Frankel and Wei (1992) type of test for east 
Asia applied by Kawai (2007) and Kearney and Muckley (2007), and complementary 
evidence by Hernandez and Montiel (2003)].  
Another by-product of the east-Asian crisis were calls by regional organizations and some 
observers for the start of financial cooperation in the region (Girardin 2004). However, after 
cleaning up the financial turmoil generated by the crisis, most attention focused on the 
monetary side of regional cooperation. Some observers championed a basket currency, 
possibly anchoring a regional currency arrangement not dissimilar to the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (Kawai 2007). Active debate centered 
on the costs and benefits of such a basket currency, its composition—particularly with 
respect to the weights to be used, as well as its potential functions. Would it initially serve as 
the basis of a divergence indicator, or as the currency for denomination of bonds (Girardin 
and Steinherr 2008)? The diversity of the east-Asian countries involved (among ASEAN+3) 
was so large—compared to the similarity of initial ERM member countries [even if trade 
integration was similar (ADB 2008)]—that it led to a high degree of skepticism about the 
likelihood of the birth of an Asian Exchange Rate Mechanism. The diversity in economic size 
and level of development among east-Asian countries was particularly crucial in that these 
characteristics were changing rapidly across the region. 
2.2  Inferring De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes 
Generalizing work on bilateral pegs proposed by Giavazzi and Giovannini (1990) to a multi-
anchor or basket peg, Frankel and Wei (1992) suggested using the following estimation 
equation to infer de facto weights in the basket: 
∆logSt = c +Σj ωj ∆logEjt + ut
where S
                  (1) 
t is the number of SDRs per unit of domestic currency, and Ejt
Frankel and Wei (1992) interpreted, for example, a coefficient ω  close to unity for the 
dollar—with a small standard error and a high explanatory power—as implying a tight peg to 
the dollar for the domestic currency during the estimation period. In another line of inquiry, 
 is the number of 
SDRs per unit of currency j, with j= dollar, euro, yen. The numeraire chosen should be 
similar to the one used by governments in measuring deviations from the target basket. It is 
likely they would use a weighted average of currencies instead of the Swiss franc (which 
was initially used in such estimations). Inserting a similar measure in the equation minimizes 
the correlation between the numeraire and the error term (Frankel and Wei 2008). ADBI Working Paper 262    Girardin 
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work attempting to provide a de  facto classification of exchange rate regimes—such as 
Gosh, Gulde, and Wolf (2002) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003), which Hernandez 
and Montiel (2003) built on for east Asia—does not look at exchange-rate variability alone 
(prices), but rather compares it to the variability in foreign currency reserves (quantities). The 
question they address is: when there is a shock that increases international demand for the 
domestic currency, to what extent do authorities allow it to show up as an appreciation, and 
to what extent as an increase in foreign-currency reserves?  
In order to encompass the two approaches, Frankel and Wei (2008) propose to augment the 
Frankel and Wei (1992) specification (equation 1) with an Exchange-Market-Pressure (EMP) 
variable. EMP is defined as the sum of the changes in the value of the currency and in 
foreign-currency reserves. The estimation-equation of the synthesis model suggested by 
Frankel and Wei (2008) is as follows: 
∆logSt = c +Σj ωj ∆logEjt + γ ∆logEMPt + vt
where the percentage change in EMP is calculated as 
              (2) 
 ∆logEMPt = ∆logSt + ∆logRt
with the foreign-currency reserves denoted by R
.                        (3) 
t
In order to ensure that all coefficients sum to unity, Frankel and Wei (2008) suggest 
subtraction of pound-sterling returns from currency returns on both sides of equation (3), as 
in (4): 
. The ω(j) coefficients capture the de facto 
weights on the constituent currencies, while the de facto degree of exchange-rate flexibility is 
measured by coefficient γ. The polar exchange-rate regimes are represented by the extreme 
values of the latter coefficient. A  pure float corresponds to  γ  =1,  since, in the absence of 
intervention in the foreign exchange market, foreign currency reserves do not change. A 
completely-fixed exchange-rate regime is detected when γ  =0,  which implies that  the 
exchange rate never changes in value. Any value of γ  between  0  and  1  indicates 
intermediate exchange-rate regimes.  
(∆logSt – ∆log£t ) = c + Σj wj (∆logEjt – ∆log£t ) + g ∆logEMPt + εt
where  £
         (4) 
t
2.3  Detecting Regime Changes in Basket Composition 
  equal the  number of SDRs per pound sterling, and the coefficient [1-  {Σw(j)}] 
represents the weight on the pound.  
The possibility that the composition of basket pegs, as detected by the estimation of 
equations such as (4), may change over time was initially examined simply through splitting 
the sample in an ad hoc way, or around known policy changes [as for the yuan in Frankel 
and Wei (2007), updated by Frankel (2009) and Shu, Chow, and Chan (2007)]. Rolling 
regressions (Kawai 2007) or time-varying unobserved-component methods are also used 
(Ogawa and Sakane 2006). Very recently, multiple structural break tests, designed by Bai 
and Perron (2003), have been used to endogenize dates of regime changes, between which 
a linear estimation of equation (4) is implemented. This methodology is used with daily data 
(beginning in the late 1990s) for the Thai baht by Frankel and Xie (2010), and by Zeileis, 
Shah, and Patnaik (2010) beginning in the late 1970s. 
The use of Markov-switching models to allow the exchange-rate dynamics to alternate 
between regimes was pioneered by Engle and Hamilton (1990). They show the presence of 
long swings in the mean and volatility of the US dollar–German mark exchange rate with 
quarterly data from 1973 through 1988. Engle (1994) extends the evidence to 18 currencies, 
and further extensions are provided by Bollen, Gray, and Whaley (2000). Cheung and 
Erlandsson (2005) show with simulations the importance of testing for the presence of ADBI Working Paper 262    Girardin 
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regime-switching against the linear alternative. Their results imply that a sufficiently high 
frequency must be used since a Markov-switching specification may be rejected for a 
quarterly frequency but accepted for a monthly frequency. Markov-switching models also 
provide evidence of regime changes in stock markets—with bull and bear episodes (Girardin 
and Liu 2003), or in economic activity—with growth cycles (Girardin 2005). They were 
extended to allow for regime changes in the coefficients of explanatory variables, or even in 
a vector-autoregressive framework (Krolzig 1997). 
3.   METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
3.1  Methodology 
Instability in the estimated coefficients of the synthesis equation (4) is indeed an important 
issue. A major difficulty faced by standard methods of estimation, and even less-standard 
methods of break detection, is that the global financial crisis is a recent development, 
possibly leaving too few observations after the break. Given this difficulty, it seems relevant 
to compare two alternative approaches to regime-switching detection: Hamilton’s (1989; 




The strength of the Markov-switching approach is that it detects the rise of regimes which 
may have been present in the past, even temporarily (Hamilton 1989). The relevant sample 
size is thus much larger than a few recent observations. In the Markov-switching 
specification, all coefficients in equation (4) can become regime dependent. The estimation 
equation of the regime-dependent version of the synthesis model of Frankel and Wei (2008) 
that we employ for two regimes (s=1,2) is then as follows: 
(∆logSt – ∆log£t ) = c(st) + Σj wj (st) (∆logEjt – ∆log£t ) + g(st) ∆logEMPt
+ Σ
  
k bk (st) (∆logSt-k – ∆log£t-k ) + σ
 (st)
 µt
In a regime-switching model of returns, some or all parameters depend on an underlying 
unobservable stochastic variable, s
         (5) 
t, which aims at representing the phases of the returns 
regimes (Hamilton 1994). Use of this approach enables us to assign probabilities to the 
occurrence of the different regimes. In its most popular version, which we use here, it is 
assumed that the process st
An expected maximization algorithm for maximum likelihood estimation is used to obtain 
estimates of the parameters in such a Markov-switching model (Hamilton 1994). For a given 
parametric specification of the model, probabilities are assigned to the unobserved-return 
regimes, conditional on the available information set which constitute an optimal inference 
on the latent state of the economy. We thus obtain the constant probability of staying in a 
given regime when starting from that regime, as well as the probability of shifting to another 
regime. The classification of regimes and the dating of periods imply that every observation 
in the sample is assigned to one of the regimes. We assign an observation to a specific 
 is a first-order Markov process (Hamilton 1989), while higher-
order processes are much less frequently used. We also allow for the dynamics arising from 
autoregressive lags whenever they prove significant, according to information criteria, and 
useful to suppress residual autocorrelation. We assume that the regime-generating process 
is an ergodic Markov chain with a finite number of states, governed by constant transition. All 
coefficients of equation (5), plus the variance, are assumed to be regime-dependent. We use 
standard information criteria to check that the null of linearity is rejected.  
                                                 
2 The first to use this method was made by Patnaik and Shah (2010), who were unable to detect any recent 
break for the few Asian currencies they examined (PRC yuan, Republic of Korean won, and Indian rupiah).  
Frankel and Xie (2010) used it on weekly data with a controversial interpolation of monthly reserve data. ADBI Working Paper 262    Girardin 
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regime when the smoothed probability of being in that regime is higher than 0.5. The 
smoothed probability is computed by using all observations in the sample. 
Multiple Structural Break Test 
An alternative approach to detect structural beaks was proposed by Bai and Perron (2003). 
It is important to test the hypothesis of structural breaks against the no-break alternative in 
case the multiple regime Markov-switching specification is rejected in favor  of linearity. 
Moreover, it may be of interest to use information criteria (Schwartz’s Bayesian criterion) to 
test the multiple break assumption against the Markov-switching one. 




t – ∆log£t ) = ci + Σj wi(i) (∆logEjt – ∆log£t ) + g(i) ∆logEMPt
                                  + Σ
  
k bk(i) (∆logSt-k – ∆log£t-k ) + ϖt
t= T
                                                       (6) 
i-1+1,…,Ti; T0=0; Tm+1
The specification in (6) allows m structural breaks, and m+1 exchange-rate-regime 
parameters (g), as well as basket weights (w), intercepts (c), or autoregressive coefficients. 
The break dates are endogenous (not known in advance). Break dates are estimated using 
Generalized Least Squares. Subsequently, the best partition (T1,…,Tm) is obtained by using 
dynamic programming, as suggested by Bai and Perron (2003), in order to minimize a 
partition-dependent objective function. For the best partition we obtain for each linear regime 
the b, c, g, and w parameters. A minimum window of 12 months between two breaks is 
used, which corresponds to up to 10% of the observations
=T;    i=1,…,m+1. 
2
Common Factor Estimation 
. 
We use principal component analysis (PCA) to extract the common component in east-Asian 
exchange-rate returns in which the estimated factors are only linear combinations of current 
exchange-rate returns for the component currencies. We thus refrain from using some 
alternative estimation techniques (e.g., Forni, Lippi, and Reichlin 2000), since they involve 
leads and lags. The traditional approach to the implementation of PCA is based on the linear 
projection of the original data onto a space where the variance is maximized. Employing 
such PCA, with Xt an N-dimensional multiple time series (in our case, currency returns), it is 
assumed that the latter admit a factor-model representation with r common latent factors Ft
X
:  
t = A Ft + et
where e
                                                                                                      (7) 
t
3.2   Data and Construction of Regional Monetary Units 
 is an N x 1 vector of idiosyncratic disturbances. In cases where such idiosyncratic 
disturbances are cross-sectionally independent and temporally independent and identically 
distributed (i.i.d), then (7) would correspond to traditional factor analysis. However, to the 
extent that such assumptions are unlikely to be met, we prefer to employ the methodology 
suggested by Stock and Watson (2002), which allows the error terms to be cross-sectionally 
and serially correlated.  
The source of data used in this paper is the IMF’s International Financial Statistics CD-ROM. 
These data include both mean monthly exchange rates expressed in terms of SDRs, and 
end-of-month foreign-currency reserves for 12 of the 13 ASEAN+3 countries. Data for 
reserves covering our sample for the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) are 
unavailable. The data sample spans January 1999 through May 2009.  Two alternative 
                                                 
1 This corresponds to the specification suggested by Frankel and Xie (2010). 
2 We make an exception for the PRC yuan since the July 2008 break is only ten months before the end of our 
sample. ADBI Working Paper 262    Girardin 
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measures of an ACU for east Asia are used in this paper, both constructed employing PCA. 
In order to construct an EMP index, forward positions of central banks in the foreign 
exchange market are used, extracted from the IMF Special Data Dissemination Standard 
(SDDS) database. 
Common Factor 
Common factors are extracted using  the Stock and Watson (2002) method for PCA and 
applied to the SDR returns of the currencies of the 13 ASEAN+3 countries. In the first factor 
(ACU-PC13), a group of 11 currency returns move in the same direction on average but at 
very different frequencies, with Indonesia's currency return moving much more than those of 
other countries (Figure 1). The yen and the Lao PDR kip move in the opposite direction. In 
subsequent analysis, the first principal component for 11 currencies (ACU-PC11) is 
extracted, with those for Japanese and Lao PDR currencies excluded. In all cases, such a 
first factor accounts for more than two-fifths of the variance, and is the only one with an 
eigenvalue larger than one. 
Figure 1: Weights in Stock and Watson Principal Component Analysis, 
 February 1999 to May 2009 
 
 




Figure 2: Spot and Total Reserves (including forward positions) Held by Some East-
Asian Central Banks (US$ billion) 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund: International Financial Statistics and SDDS 
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Foreign Currency Reserves with Forward Positions 
Six central banks in east Asia held substantial forward positions over at least part of our 
sample period. Indonesia also used them from 2005 to 2008, but with with initial (and final) 
upward (and downward) discrete jumps which did not alter the dynamics of its reserves (thus 
not reported here). In all cases except Japan in late 2008 and early 2009, such positions 
enabled these countries to enhance their total reserves (Figure 2). The addition to spot 
reserves represented by forward positions was constant for the Republic of Korea from late 
2005 to mid-2008, while it rose over time in the Philippines and Singapore. For Malaysia and 
Thailand, it was substantial only from 2007 onwards. Accordingly, for these countries 
changes in total reserves may be substantially different from movements in spot reserves. 
4.  UNCOVERING DE FACTO EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES 
IN EAST ASIA 
Estimating the synthesis model of Frankel and Wei (2008) in a regime-switching framework, 
we compare the Markov-switching and structural-break models in order to investigate the 
possible move toward greater exchange rate flexibility and the extent of targeting a regional 
monetary unit (RMU) by east-Asian countries. 
4.1  From Dollar to Asian Currency Unit Pegging 
A majority of currencies in the region (9 out of 13) show evidence of a change in regime over 
the 1999–2009 sample. The Markov-switching specification with two regimes for equation (5) 
is indeed accepted for six countries (Cambodia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, and Viet Nam) on the basis of Schwartz’s Bayesian information criterion reported 
in Table 1, column 2. Figures 3 to 6 present for each of the six countries with regime change 
the smoothed probabilities of the first regime (the probability of the second regime is simply 
the complement to unity). Three countries (the PRC, Indonesia, and the Lao PDR) show 
evidence of a dominance of the structural-break model (Table 1, columns 3 to 6). In contrast, 
the linear specification with no break is dominant for the Philippines, Singapore–Brunei 
Darussalam,
4
                                                 
4 Brunei Darussalam had a currency board vis-a-vis the Singapore dollar over the whole of the sample period 
used in this paper. With a Singapore-dollar peg being the dominant specification, there was not a detectable 
difference between the behaviors of the two currencies. 




Table 1: Linearity versus Regime-Switching Tests 
BIC-SC  Linear  Markov-
switching 
BP : 1 
break 
BP : 2 
breaks 
BP : 3 
breaks 




Cambodia   -10.236  -10.598  -10.168  -9.969  -9.951  -9.862  - 
PRC   -11.386  -11.338  -11.665  -11.948  -12.107  -12.067  2005 :6 
2007 :3 
2008 :4 
Indonesia   -6.612  -6.75 
a  -6.785  -6.742  -6.684  2000 :1 
2008 :3 
Japan   -8.03  -8.208  -8.111  -8.102  -7.995  -8.124  - 
Republic of 
Korea  
-8.574  -8.758  -8.452  -8.455  -8.438  -8.353  - 
Lao PDR   -6.47  -6.65 
a  -6.50  -6.381  -6.25  2000 :1 
Malaysia   -9.72  -15.458  -10.354  -10.599  -11.0  -11.557  - 
Myanmar   -11.637  -12.392  -11.579  -11.601  -11.443  -11.344  - 
Philippines   -8.957  -8.738  -8.855  -8.833  -8.710  -8.589  - 
Singapore   -10.05  -10.028  -9.763  -9.565  -9.373  -9.215  - 
Thailand   -8.677  -8.618  -8.536  -8.498  -8.203  -8.037  - 
Viet Nam   -8.68  -11.08  -9.09  -8.95  -8.82  -8.67         - 
BIC-SC = Schwartz Bayesian Information Criterion, BP = Bai and Perron test, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, PRC = People’s Republic of China.  
Notes: 
In all cases BIC-SC corresponds to the estimation of equations (4) and (5) for each currency. The specification used 
corresponds to dollar and euro for Indonesia and Viet Nam. In addition, the yen (ACU-PC13) is included for the 
Republic of Korea and Myanmar (PRC and Japan). For all other countries, ACU-PC11 replaces ACU-PC13. 
ACU-PC11 and ACU-PC13 report the first Stock and Watson (2002) principal component among 11 and 13 
currencies, respectively, excluding and including the Lao PDR kip and the yen. 
The first column corresponds to the linear specification. Column (2) reports the Markov-switching two-regime case. 
Subsequent columns report the Bai and Perron (2003) tests for one to four breaks. The best models are highlighted 
in bold letters. 
a
Source: Author’s calculations 
 For Indonesia and the Lao PDR, even though the Markov-switching specification minimized the BIC (6.818 and 
8.038, respectively), one of the regimes presented insignificant parameters.  
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Figure 3: Currency with Main Regime Change in 2005 
(Probability of Regime One) 
 
    Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 Figure 4: Currencies with Main Regime Change in 2003–2004 
(Probability of Regime One) 
 Source: Author’s calculations 
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Figure 5: Currency with Main Regime Change in 2003–2004 and 2005–2006  
(Probability of Regime One) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Figure 6: Currencies with Other Timing in Regime Change  
(Probability of Regime One) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
On the basis of these results, across specifications, five categories of countries are notable. 
The first group, which includes Malaysia and the PRC, is characterized by a sharp and 
persistent regime change in mid-2005. However, the PRC subsequently departs from 
Malaysia since it shows a first break in March 2007—during its managed-float period—and a 
second break in the early summer of 2008 (Figure 3 and Table 1, column 7). In a second 
group, which includes Japan and the Republic of Korea with a broadly similar timing, the 
regime change occurred earlier (in 2003), was temporary (ending in 2004), but reemerged in 
2008–2009 (Figure 4). In the case of Japan, the first occurrence of this other regime 
corresponded to a period of well-documented heavy intervention by Japanese authorities 
(Girardin and Lyons 2008). Cambodia belongs to both the first and second groups since it 
showed evidence of temporary regime change in both 2003 and in 2005, as well as a ADBI Working Paper 262    Girardin 
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reemergence of the second regime at the end of the sample (Figure 5). In the fourth group, 
composed of Myanmar and Viet Nam, some temporary regime changes occurred in late 
2000 or early 2001, as well as in early 2005 for the former country and from 2007 onwards 
for the latter (Figure 6). Viet Nam showed evidence of a new regime in late 2007. Finally, in 
both Indonesia and the Lao PDR, a new regime appeared with the new millennium—in a 
permanent way for the latter country, but only for 8 years in the former. The stability of the 
currency regimes of the Philippines, Singapore-Brunei, and Thailand is remarkable. 
4.2  Exchange Market Pressure 
The coefficient of EMP in the single (different) regime(s) enables us to gauge the degree of 
flexibility of the exchange rate regimes adopted by the ASEAN+3 countries (Table 2). 
Flexible exchange rates were present in the dominant regime (regime One) and already in 
action in the new millennium—unambiguously in Japan, and less so in the Republic of 
Korea, with an EMP coefficient equal to 1.0 for Japan and 0.7 for the Republic of Korea.  
    Table 2: Coefficient on Exchange Market Pressure 




Japan  Rep. of 
Korea 
Malaysia 
One  0.01  0.00/0.00  0.281**  1.0**  0.7**  0.0 
Two  0.06*  0.16**/0.21**  -  0.2**  0.25*  0.09** 
Regime  Myanmar  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand  Viet Nam   
One  0.0  0.21**  0.13**  0.32*  0.01   
Two  0.0  -  -  -  0.3**   
** = significant at the 5% (* 1%) level, PRC = People’s Republic of China, Rep. = Republic. 
Notes: 
1. The Lao People’s Democratic Republic was omitted due to the unavailability of foreign currency reserve data over 
our sample. In all cases this corresponds to the estimation of equation (4) or (5) for each currency. 
2. Sample: January 1999–May 2009, Regime One and Two are as defined in the Markov-switching estimation, 
except:  
Regime One corresponds to February 1999–June 2005 and July 2008–May 2009, and the alternative regime to July 
2005–March 2007/March 2007–June 2008.  
(b)   January 2000–February 2008. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
The usual “fear of floating” (Calvo and Reinhart 2002) seems to have been widespread 
among the remaining 11 countries. A de facto fixed exchange-rate regime is documented 
with different modalities in two groups of countries. Indeed, such a regime is valid for the 
whole sample for Cambodia, Malaysia, and Myanmar. It is valid only in regime One for the 
PRC [confirming the evidence provided by the rolling regressions of Frankel (2009)] and Viet 
Nam, both characterized by the presence of an alternate intermediate regime with only a 
moderate EMP coefficient (0.15 to 0.3). Such an intermediate regime is present all along for 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore–Brunei Darussalam, and Thailand. 
4.3  Targeting Blocs in East Asia 
With respect to the composition of the basket to be included in the specification—selected, 
for a given number of regimes, on the basis of likelihood-ratio tests—four categories of 
currencies can be distinguished (Table 3). First, the PRC before mid-2005 and after mid-
2008 was the only country where the dollar-only specification dominated. Second, Indonesia 
(up to the summer of 2008) and Viet Nam included the euro as well as the dollar. In addition ADBI Working Paper 262    Girardin 
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to these two currencies, the yen was included for a group of three countries—the PRC 
(2007–2008), the Republic of Korea, and Myanmar. All other countries included some 
regional monetary unit on top of the dollar-euro. In a majority of cases—i.e., for Cambodia, 
the Lao PDR, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore–Brunei Darussalam, and Thailand—this 
ACU represented the 11-country factor, excluding the yen and the Lao PDR kip. Two 
countries were singled out with the inclusion in their basket of a 13-country factor: Japan 
during the period of heavy intervention in 2003–2004 and the PRC in the first part of its 
managed-float period (July 2005–March 2007).  
On the basis of the weights on the different components of the basket in the single regime, 
or in each of the regimes, a return to a dollar peg after the east-Asian crisis is confirmed only 
for a minority of countries, including Cambodia, the PRC, Malaysia, and Viet Nam (Table 4). 
A “yen bloc,” in which the yen was targeted alongside the euro and the dollar, was present 
permanently for the Republic of Korea and Myanmar, but only for a limited time in the PRC 
(in the second part of the managed-float period). An RMU bloc had already emerged in the 
late 1990s and remains in place in the Lao PDR (from the early 2000s), the Philippines, and 
Singapore–Brunei Darussalam, as well as in Thailand. The bloc was joined in mid-2005 by 
Malaysia (permanently) and by Cambodia and the PRC (temporarily); Japan joined the bloc 
temporarily in 2003–2004. It is remarkable that the weights on the dollar, the 11-country 
ACU-PC11, and the euro were almost identical for the Philippines, Singapore–Brunei 
Darussalam, and Thailand, and have been invariant since the late 1990s. It is well known 
that Malaysia followed the PRC in abandoning the dollar peg in July 2005, but our results 
show that this emulation went as far as replicating closely the weights on the dollar, the euro, 
and the RMU set by the PRC authorities. These results confirm for the yuan the rolling-
regression estimates of the synthesis model (Frankel 2009),
5 which show that (in a four-
currency basket) the weights on the dollar and the euro respectively fell and rose to 0.5 and 
0.45  in the first semester of 2008. The presence of an RMU in the yuan basket from 2005 to 
2007, as well as the weight obtained for the dollar, conform with speeches in 2005 and 2006 
by Zhou Xiaochuan, Governor of the People’s Bank of China (Zhu 2005; 2006). 
A high value of the coefficient of determination (R
He 
confirmed that 11 currencies were included in the basket—selected on the basis of shares of 
trade in goods and services, foreign direct investment, and current transfers—and that the 
weight of the dollar was close to half. 
2
                                                 
5  In contrast, Zeileis, Shah, and Patnaik (2010) were unable to document departures from a full dollar peg during 
the managed float period of the yuan—which raises questions about the adequacy of the modified Bai-Perron 
procedure they developed. 
) in the Frankel and Wei (1992) model is 
sometimes interpreted as a sign of limited exchange rate flexibility (Zeileis, Shah, and 
Patnaik 2010). On this metric, unavailable for Markov-switching models, the PRC shows the 
least flexibility of all the regimes, followed by Singapore–Brunei Darussalam, the Philippines, 
and Thailand with limited flexibility. Indonesia shows a high degree of flexibility, which is in 
contradiction with the more rigorous result from the EMP coefficient. The Lao PDR shows 
some flexibility, which made up for the lack of sufficient data on reserve holdings and the 
resulting inability to build an EMP measure. At any rate, the intercept can be interpreted as 
giving an indication of trend appreciation (depreciation) vis-a-vis the SDR when it is 
significantly positive (negative). In almost all cases, the only documented trend 
corresponded to a depreciation as reported in the penultimate column of Table 4. In the case 
of the PRC over the two subsamples spanning July 2005–July  2008, the latter results 
confirm the findings of Frankel (2009), with the difference that the intercept is significant 
here. Finally, by construction, equations (4) and (5) imply that one minus the sum of reported 
weights on basket components corresponds to the weight on the pound sterling. The latter 
weight was smaller than 5% for the vast majority of countries. The only true exceptions were 
Myanmar and Thailand, since in the other two cases—the first regime for Japan (Republic of 
Korea)—this corresponds to (close to) free floating, a regime where the adding up constraint 


















Cambodia   434.6  435.8   460.5   460.7*  446.4   7  
























Indonesia (b)  229.1  232.5*   233.1   n.a.  n.a.   0 
Japan   344.8  374.9   -   375.7   379.8*   5  
Rep. Of 
Korea  
370.4  377.2   404.7*   380.3   377.9   2  
Lao PDR (c)  300.3  302.9  304.1  311.1*  310.0  0 
Malaysia   780.8  788.7   788.8   816.4*   790.0   6  
Myanmar   369.3  419.8   509.5*   425.8   437.7   6  
Philippines   368.7  381.2   382.4   391.4*   383.4   0  
Singapore   404.4  447.2   419.3   450.9*   449.6   7  
Thailand   350.7  367.5   367.9   372.4*  368.9   3  
Viet Nam   533.7  535.8*   537.4   536.0   536.3  0   
ACU-PC11 and ACU-PC13 report the first Stock and Watson (2002) principal component among 11 and 13 
currencies, respectively, excluding and including the Lao PDR kip and the yen; Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic; PRC = People’s Republic of China; Rep. = Republic. 
Notes: 
1. AR(L) denotes the number of autoregressive lags necessary to ensure the absence of autocorrelation. 
2. ACU-PC11 and ACU-PC13 report the first Stock and Watson (2002) principal component among 11 and 13 
currencies, respectively, excluding and including the Lao PDR kip and the yen. 
3. N.a. (not available) means that the specification yielded inconsistent coefficients.  
4. The benchmark in all specifications is the dollar and euro basket for which the Log likelihood is reported in the first 
column. The specifications reported in the other columns add in turn one variable to that benchmark. For the 
associated likelihood ratio test to be significant at the 1% and 5% level, the likelihood should be larger than the one 
reported for the benchmark by an amount of 3.3 and 1.9, respectively. Figures followed by a star indicate the best 
model chosen on the basis of a likelihood ratio test. In all cases this corresponds to the estimation of equation (4) or 
(5) for each currency respectively for the linear and Markov-switching models.  
5. Sample: January 1999–May 2009, except:  
(a) first row:  January 1999- June 2005; second row: July 2005–March 2007; third row: March 2007–June 2008; 
Fourth row: July 2008-May 2009.  
(b) January 2000–February 2008; and  
(c) January 2000–May 2009 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Overall, three “blocs” can be distinguished in the light of the above results. The first, a dollar 
bloc, from the late 1990s or early millennium, included Cambodia, the PRC, Malaysia, and 
Viet Nam. A second bloc included countries with stable exchange-rate regimes over the 
entire sample which formed the core of an ACU bloc: the Lao PDR, the Philippines, 
Singapore–Brunei Darussalam, and Thailand. This bloc was joined  by Malaysia and the 
PRC in mid-2005, as well as occasionally by Cambodia and temporarily by Japan. Both 
Japan and the PRC targeted a wider ACU than the other countries in the bloc since they 
included the yen. The third bloc comprised Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, and Myanmar 
(joined by Viet Nam in 2008), which targeted the dollar and the euro (to which the Republic 
of Korea added the yen). ADBI Working Paper 262    Girardin 
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 Table 4: Currency Weights in the Baskets of East-Asian Currencies 
RRg1  US 
Dollar 
Euro  Yen  PC11  PC13  Cst.  R
2 






     
0.31 































Indonesia (b)               0.55  0.45        -0.55**  0.361 


































Lao PDR (c)  0.60      0.42    0.00  0.64 









   
 
0.17 






















Philippines  0.49  0.19    0.36    -0.39**  0.84 
Singapore  0.45  0.17    0.34    0.00  0.92 
Thailand  0.48  0.10    0.30    -0.31**  0.74 














Cst. = intercept; Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic; ACU-PC11 and ACU-PC13 report the first Stock and 
Watson (2002) principal component among 11 and 13 currencies, respectively, excluding and including the Lao PDR 
kip and the yen; , R
2
Notes: 
 = Coefficient of determination. 
1. In all cases this corresponds to the estimation of equation (5) for each currency.  
2. N.a. means unavailable for Markov-switching estimation.  
3. ** means significant at the 5% level.  
4. Since only the significant variables were kept in the linear equations, the adjusted R
2
5. Sample: January 1999–May 2009; 1) corresponds to the Markov-switching regime One, and 2) to regime Two, 
except:  
 is very close to the 
unadjusted one which is reported here. 
a) First row: February 1999–June 2005; Second row: July 2005–March 2007; Third row: March 2007–May 2008; 
Fourth row: July 2008–May 2009. 
b) January 2000–February 2008; and  
c) January 2000– May 2009. 




4.4  Tests of Robustness 
The presence of multicolinearity may seem to put into question the robustness of the results 
reported in Table 4. In the Appendix we thus report Generalized Method of Moments 
estimation for the four countries which show stability of a linear model over a long-enough 
sample: the Lao PDR, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The single-equation results 
seem to be robust since the weights are only marginally changed, except for the Philippines, 
with a rise of the coefficient on the euro (Appendix table).  
We experimented with alternative measures of the ACU, such as one constructed in a way 
similar to the European Currency Unit with weights based on nominal GDP, trade shares, 
and financial links (as suggested in Girardin and Steinherr 2008). However, such an ACU 
was always dominated by the ACU-PC for all countries, so the results are not reported. 
5.   IMPLICATIONS OF ASIAN CURRENCY UNIT PEGS 
The presence of a de facto ACU bloc in east Asia and its implications for regional 
cooperation require explanation. 
5.1   Interpretation 
Evidence presented in the previous section implies that basket pegs have been the rule in 
east Asia, with a predominance of an ACU bloc. Such pegs could have been the result of 
three nonexclusive forces: deliberate exchange-rate targeting by governments [a la Frankel 
and Wei (1992)], common shocks [as in Hernandez and Montiel (2003)], or market behavior. 
The strength of the synthesis model compared to the initial Frankel and Wei (1992) 
specification lies in its ability to help us discriminate between these possible driving forces. 
Indeed, when the coefficient on EMP was close to zero the interpretations which 
emphasized the role of common shocks and market factors can be ruled out. This was the 
case in the dominant (or single) regime for all countries except Japan and the Republic of 
Korea (where this is true in the alternative regime), and during the global financial crisis for 
all countries except Thailand and Viet Nam. Accordingly, the dominant presence of an ACU 
bloc for a large majority of east-Asian countries in the decade following the east-Asian crisis 
seems to have been due to deliberate action by governments. 
5.2  Regional Cooperation in Light of Asian Currency Unit 
Targeting 
Three main implications of the existence of a de facto ACU bloc can be drawn with respect 
to regional cooperation. First, since a majority of east-Asian countries started targeting the 
ACU by stealth, with several of them even applying very similar basket weights, it may be 
better for them to start doing it in a coordinated way, defining jointly the shares of their 
currencies in the regional basket. This conclusion is supported by our results on the diversity 
of regional monetary units involved in the targeting: even though a majority of countries de 
facto coordinated on a common 11-currency target, the two largest countries favored a wider 
basket. Second, though it may seem that the region would benefit from coordinating on the 
nature of the target, it is less clear whether details of the target should be made public. 
Indeed, it may be desirable to keep such information confidential in order to avoid attracting 
speculative attacks in a world with high international capital mobility (Genberg 2006). 
Secrecy of targets also would help, in a microstructural perspective (Vitale 1999), maximize 
the effectiveness of interventions, by keeping the exchange rate target as private information 
of the authorities. ADBI Working Paper 262    Girardin 
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The third implication concerns regional financial cooperation. To the extent that RMU 
targeting is present, a regional financial institution would benefit from “officially” declaring 
some weights as a basis for better coordination of countries on the basket that they target, 
and for issuance of bonds denominated in such a unit. Further, greater reserve pooling 
within the Multilateralized Chiang Mai Initiative (CMIM), and strengthened regional economic 
surveillance within the Economic Review and Policy Dialogue (Kawai and Takagi 2009), may 
contribute to reaching exchange rate targets de facto adopted by many countries in the 
region. 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has provided evidence about changes in the exchange-rate regimes of east-
Asian countries during the decade following the east-Asian financial crisis. Changes in both 
the degree of exchange rate flexibility and the nature of the basket peg of their currencies 
were documented. 
Evidence for changes in the new millennium in the exchange rate regimes for 9 of the 13 
ASEAN+3 countries was found. There was a collective break, but with some lags in the 
timing. Japan and the Republic of Korea acted early (in 2003–2004) but temporarily, while 
the PRC and Malaysia acted later (in 2005) but more permanently. Cambodia emulated 
these four countries, but on a temporary basis. Such strategies, with some countries 
following the lead of others, may be replicated after the recent decision (June 2010) by the 
PRC to return to a managed float. At any rate, the global financial crisis corresponded to a 
break for only one country: Viet Nam.  
East-Asian currencies were linked for the entire data sample period to an exchange-rate 
basket. Since a large majority of them were characterized by the predominance of de facto 
fixed exchange rates, we were able to rule out common-shocks or market forces as the 
origins of such baskets in favor of discretionary targeting by governments. Only a few 
countries allowed a substantial degree of exchange rate flexibility. This was the case in 
Japan and the Republic of Korea for a substantial part of the sample, including part of the 
global financial crisis period. It also was true in Thailand and Viet Nam during the global 
financial crisis. For these four cases, the alternative interpretations may be partly relevant. 
A change in the nature of the basket peg of east-Asian currencies was noted. Only a 
minority of countries (4 out of 13) went back to a dollar peg after the east-Asian crisis, but 
they later gave some non-negligible weight to the euro, and often to an RMU. The basket 
composition in east Asia is a three-speed affair. Half of ASEAN countries (the Lao PDR, the 
Philippines, Singapore–Brunei Darussalam, and Thailand) target, de facto, a basket, with 
very similar weights, including an RMU, forming a core ACU bloc. This paper is the first to 
provide such evidence. Such a core group was enlarged temporarily by Cambodia, the PRC, 
and Japan, and permanently with Malaysia. Some countries, including the PRC (very briefly) 
and Myanmar (more permanently) rather joined the Republic of Korea in including the yen in 
their baskets. Finally, Indonesia (most of the time) and Viet Nam (permanently) targeted only 
the dollar-euro. 
Overall, implicit coordination seems to be at work among many countries in east Asia. On 
one hand, only one country (Viet Nam) left de facto fixity to unilaterally allow more flexibility 
during the global financial crisis. On the other hand, coordination went much farther than 
affecting just the timing of regime changes or basket components to involve even the 
weights in the basket. This was the case with Malaysia following the PRC in 2005–2007, and 
for the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore–Brunei Darussalam for more than a decade. 
At least three significant implications for regional cooperation can be drawn from the above 
evidence of the de facto ACU bloc in east Asia. First, to the extent that many Asian countries 
have started targeting an RMU by stealth, it may be better for all of them to start doing this in ADBI Working Paper 262    Girardin 
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a coordinated way, defining jointly the shares of their currencies in the regional basket. 
Second, it is not clear that countries in the region would benefit from making their (joint) 
target explicit. Secrecy may help maximize the effectiveness of interventions and provide 
some protection against speculative attacks in today’s environment of highly-integrated 
international financial markets—unless governments are  ready to maintain or strengthen 
capital controls. The third implication concerns regional financial cooperation. To the extent 
that RMU targeting is present—and depending on actions taken regarding the previous 
point—a regional financial institution may wish to declare basket weights in order to facilitate 
coordinated targeting as well as provide a basis for the issuance of bonds denominated in 
such a unit. Also, greater multilateral regional reserve pooling may help in reaching the 
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Controlling for Multi-colinearity 
 
In order to check whether multi-colinearity may have biased the weights obtained in the 
currency baskets of east-Asian countries, we conducted Generalized Method of Moments 
(Hansen 1982) estimation. We included only currencies for which the linear specification was 
accepted over a long-enough sample (this excluded the People’s Republic of China over its 
second subsample), and in which the east-Asian common factor (ACU-PC11) was 
significant. As reported in the table, in three-fourths of cases the weights were only 
marginally changed. The only exception was the Philippines, with a sharp rise of the 
coefficient on the euro.  
 
Table A1: Generalized Method of Moments Estimation—Currency Weights in the 
Baskets of Four East-Asian Currencies 
 
 
Cst. = Intercept, EMP = Exchange Market Pressure index, FIML =Full information maximum likelihood estimation , 
OLS = Ordinary Least Squares, PC11 = principal component among 11 currencies.Notes:  
1. In all cases this corresponds to the estimation of equation (4) for each currency. Generalized Method of Moments 
estimation with two lags of all variables plus (when appropriate on the basis of the J-statistic) two lags of the special 
drawing right (SDR)–Japanese yen returns were used as instruments. All reported parameters are significant at the 
5% level, so t-statistics were not reported.  
2. Sample: February 1999–May 2009, except: a) January 2000–May 2009. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
FIML  
[OLS] 
US Dollar  Euro  PC11  EMP  Cst. 
Lao People’s 
Democratic 
Republic  (a) 




Philippines  0.33  0.41  0.26  0.21  0.40 
Singapore  0.53  0.21  0.27   
0.05 
 
Thailand  0.42  0.27  0.30  0.47  0.48 